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Abstract 
 
The three countries took different stances in regards to economic policy; the Czech 
Republic pursued a shock therapy regime which aimed to stabilise the economy, 
Hungary’s policy was more relaxed whilst Poland had an aggressive reform programme.  
Regarding monetary policy the Czech Republic used the discount rate as a tool for 
monetary policy, Hungary used indirect monetary policy and Poland had strict monetary 
policies which raised interest rates and devalued the zloty.  After financial deregulation 
the impact of economic and monetary policy led to positive economic growth in the 
Czech Republic year on year.  Hungary had a similar experience whilst Poland had an 
initial high increase in economic growth.  This reduced over time but they still recorded 
positive economic growth over the period studied. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
By the early 1990’s all three countries had moved from centrally planned economies to 
market driven economies.  Though the three countries had similar experiences under 
socialism, there were also marked differences between them.  Poland which had the 
largest population, recorded the lowest income per capita of the three countries1.  Whilst 
all three countries income levels were high for CEEC’s (Central and Eastern European 
Countries)  they represented between one quarter and one third of that of the advanced 
Western countries.  The Czech Republic at the onset of restructuring, was the most 
politically stable with both Hungary and Poland experiencing significant political 
instability.  Hungary was the first country to introduce economic reforms as far back as 
1968.  In 1982 Poland began to liberalise whilst the Czech Republic waited until the 
early 1990’s before they undertook any move from central planning.  Since mid 1990 
Hungary accelerated its gradualist approach to reform whilst Poland launched a radical 
plan of transformation in 1990.  The Czech Republic’s approach resembled Poland’s fast 
track plan and both countries implemented large adjustments to prices.  Hungary’s 
approach to price liberalisation was again a gradual one.  Poland had the higher 
monetary overhang and the highest inflation rates.  Though the other two countries 
experienced higher inflation than previously, the Czech Republic had moderate inflation 
with price liberalisation.  Hungary already had high inflation rates in the 1980’s which 
peaked in 1990-1991.  Their approach of gradual liberalisation meant that there was 
constant pressure on prices and expectations of high inflation rates in the future.   
 
This paper outlines the economic and monetary policies followed by the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland from 1990-2003.  It examines the impact of financial liberalisation 
on economic and monetary policies and vice versa.  Further it questions the effect of 
credit  
growth on economic growth and development.  The paper is organised as follows: 
 
 
Section 2 examines economic and monetary policies following by the three countries and 
the resulting impact on economic growth 
 
Section 3 investigates credit policy in the three countries and the impact on economic 
growth and development 
 
Section 4 summarises and concludes the paper 
 
1     Anderson, R.A. and Kegels, Chantal. Transition Banking, Financial Development 
of Central and Eastern Europe, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.0 Policies pursued by the three countries 
  
 2.1 Economic Policy in the Czech Republic 
 
The Czech Republic pursued a shock therapy regime2.  Whilst they did not suffer from 
major macroeconomic imbalances they still actively followed a policy of stabilising the 
economy.  Real wages decreased by 6.3% in 1990 and 40% in 1991.  By the end of 
1991 most prices had been deregulated and most controls and imports and exports had 
been eliminated.  Liberalisation of trade and capital led to trade increasing in the Czech 
Republic from 66.9% of GDP to 104.2%3.  At the end of 1993 the private sector 
accounted for 52.8% of total employment4.  Between 1993-1995 there was a large net 
surplus on both the current and financial accounts and by 1995 official foreign reserves 
rose to $13.8 billion5.  In 1995 the Czech Republic exported 36.6% of total exports to 
Germany6.  They imported 30.3% of total imports from Germany with 10% from 
Slovakia and 7.3% from Russia and 6% from Austria.  They received 16% of total FDI 
(Foreign Direct Investment) to CEEC’s in 1996.  Most of this was from German 
investors who were the largest investors in the Czech Republic from 1990-1996.  
Official foreign reserves rose to $13.8 billion by 1995 though by the end of 1997 they 
had fallen to $9.7 billion7.  FDI was $1.4 billion in 1996, $1.3 billion in 1997 and $2.6 
billion in 1998.  Imports included communications equipment, metalworking machinery, 
chemicals and transport equipment.  1998 import figures were: machinery and transport 
39%, other manufactured goods 21%, chemicals 12%, raw materials and fuels 10% and 
food 5%.  By 1999 the ratio of FDI to GDP was 9% and 5.3% in 2000.  The private 
sector’s share of GDP was 70.8% in 20018.  (See Appendix A: Tables 1.1 and 1.2  for 
2     King, Lawrence P. “Explaining Postcommunist Economic Performance”, William 
Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School, Working Paper No. 559, 
May 2003 
3     Estrin, Saul. “Competition and Corporate Governance in Transition”, William 
Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School, Working Paper Number 
431, December 2001 
4     Op. Cit. Anderson, R.A. and Kegels, Chantal. 1988 
5     Zoubir, Y. and Lhabitant, F.S. Doing Business in Emerging Europe, Palgrave, 
Macmillan, 2003, pp1-52 
6     Kurz, Constance and Wittle, Volker.  “Using Industrial Capacities as a Way of 
Integrating the Central and East European Economies”, edited by Homi Katrak and 
Roger Strange, in Small Scale Enterprises in Developing and Transitional Countries, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002, pp63-95 
7     Op. Cit. Zoubit, Y and Lhabitant, F.S. 2003 
8     www.economist.com/countries.CzechRepublic/profits.cfm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Current Account figures and External Debt).  
  
The Czech Republic which favoured a mass privatisation approach, had overtaken Poland 
by the mid 1990’s9.  However by 1998 they saw a collapse in the capital markets and 
bank finance.  There was widespread insider trading and non-performing loans 
increased.  The Czech government was criticised for maintaining too strong a boundary 
between the state and society and this was believed to have impeded development.  A 
powerful central policy making apparatus remained whilst there were too rapid attempts 
to privatise firms.  Kogur and Spicer10 found that capitalist economies do not work 
without the development of capital markets.  There was failure to built deep capital 
markets in the Czech Republic and no reliable networks existed.  There were no 
developed bank ties, and no markets or institutional experience for trading stocks.  They 
did not have transparent market exchange of ownership of rights and most trading took 
place outside formal markets.  This contributed to the economic stagnation of the Czech 
Republic. 
 
Table 1.1 
   Industrial Production in the Czech Republic 1994-200311 
 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
91.347 90.51 92.3 96.42 96.01 94.87 100 106.53 116.61 123.43 
 
 
The Czech Republic recorded growth in years 2000 and 200112.  In 2001 growth reached 
3.6% with no significant effects on inflation which varied between 4-6%.  Annual 
growth rates of exports and imports fell due to the slowdown in economic growth abroad.  
The Czech’s economy grew by 2.9% in 2003 and the main driving force was private 
consumption (mainly households) and exports13.  Private consumption grew by 5.4%, 
9     McDermott, Gerald. A. “Institutional Change and Firm Creation in East-Central 
Europe: an Embedded Politics Approach”, William Davidson Institute, University of 
Michigan Business School, Working Paper No 590, 2003 
10     Kogur, Briuce and Spicer, Andrew. “Institutional Technology and the Chains of 
Trust: Capital Markets and Privatisation in Russia and the Czech Republic”, William 
Davidson Institute,  University of Michigan Business School, Working Paper  Number 
291, March 1999 
11     International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
12     Czech National Bank, Annual Report 2001, IV Macroeconomics and Monetary 
Developments 
13     European Economy, European Commission, Directorate General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs, Economic Forecasts, Spring 2004, No 2/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
exports grew by 6.7% whilst government consumption was 0.0%.  Real disposable 
income had increased and along with low nominal interest rates this led to an expansion 
of consumer credit, despite rising unemployment at 7.8%.  Inflation was -0.1% 
 
Table 1.2 
Imports of Goods and Services at 1995 prices in the Czech Republic (national currency, 
annual % change)14  
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
3170 3286 3792 4644 6894 8172 9676 10691 11693 12655 13583 
 
 
Increases in wages were recorded once the economy was restructured.  Between 1990 
and 1994 there was 100% increase in gross nominal wages reflecting the need for wages 
to move with prices increases following liberalisation.  By 2000 this wage level had 
increased by another 97%. 
 
Table 1.3 
Real Wages Per Head in the Czech Republic (annual % change)15  
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
9.3 7.8 -0.2 -0.4 2.9 3.4 3.4 6.6 6.5 
 
 
In real terms the wages were more modest when inflation rates are taken into account.  
Minus figures were recorded in 1997 and 1998 with low figures recorded in 1999-2001 
and rising figures to over 6% in 2002-2003. 
 
Table 1.4  
Growth of GDP/Components in the Czech Republic16 
 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
Exports 
of 
goods 
and 
service
s 
9.5 15.8 1.7 16.7 8.2 9.2 10 6.1 17 11.9 2.8 4.9 
14     European Economy, European Commission, Directorate General for Economic 
and Financial Affairs, No 6, 2003 
15     Ibid, European Economy, 6/2003 
16     Ibid, European Economy, 6/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Imports 
of 
goods 
and 
service
s 
29.7 23.8 14.7 21.2 13.4 8.1 6.6 5.4 17 13.6 4.3 4.8 
GDP -0.5 0.1 2.2 5.9 4.3 -0.8 -1.0 0.5 3.3 3.1 2.0 2.2 
 
 
Exports fluctuated and then overtook the amount of imports in 1997-1999.  They 
reached a high of 17 in 2000 but fell between 2001-2003 reflecting difficult economic 
situations in other countries, especially in the rest of the EU. 
 
Table 1.5 
Persons in Employment in the Czech Republic (annual average)17 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
4959 4968 4933 4863 4761 4728 4724 4760 4731 
 
 
The Czech Republic did not suffer from employment problems like other former CEEC 
countries.  Employment levels remained steady during the economic restructuring with a 
small increase in unemployment being experienced from 1997 onwards.  This reflected 
the change in employment patters once the large state owned enterprises were 
restructured and privatised. 
 
 2.2 Monetary Policy in the Czech Republic 
 
Throughout the nineties the Czech Republic’s prices remained fairly stable but increased 
at the beginning of 1991 following price liberalisation.  There was a tax on wage 
increases which stabilised the economy.  In 1991 inflation was a massive 56.6% which 
fell to 10.7% by 199818.  In 1991 all credit ceilings were removed leaving banks to set 
their own deposit and lending rates19.  In 1991 and 1992 the discount rate was used 
extensively as a tool for monetary policy and after 1993 an interbank money market and a 
secondary market for government securities emerged.  By 1993 inflation accelerated 
with the introduction of VAT (see table 1.6 below).  However by the following year 
inflation had halved with further reductions until 1997.  1998 saw an increase in inflation 
17     European Commission, Eurostat Yearbook 2004, The Statistical Guide to Europe, 
Data 1992-2002 
18     Op. Cit. Zoubir, Y. and Lhabitant, F.S. 2003 PP1-52 
19     Borish, Michael.s. et al, “On the Road to EU Accession, Financial Sector 
Development in Central Europe”, World Bank Discussion, Paper No. 345, 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
but there were large reductions in 1999-2000. 
 
Table 1.6 
Inflation in the Czech Republic 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
9.6 56.6 12.7 20.8 10 9.1 8.8 8.5 10.7 2.1 3.9 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, EBRD Transition Report 2000, William 
Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School 
 
In 2001 the Czech Republic experienced some inflation pressures in the middle of the 
year but they eased off towards the end of 2001 due to a fall in the major world 
economies. 
 
Table 1.7  
Interest Rate Spread in the Czech Republic 
1993 1994 1995 199
6 
1997 1998 199
9 
2000 2001 2002 200
3 
7.038 6.0475 5.837
5 
5.75 5.489 4.7277 4.203 3.74 4.323 4.726 4.616 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
Once the banks were permitted to set their own interest rate the spread began to fall.  
This reduction continued year on year though there was a slight increase in 2001. 
 
 2.3 Economic Policy in Hungary 
 
Between 1990-1993 the economy declined by 18% but by 1994 growth had stabilised at 
2.9%.  1.5% was recorded for 1995 and 1% in 1996.  By 2000 GDP growth reached 
5.5%20.  Once trade and capital were liberalised Hungary’s GDP increased.  By 1991 it 
had increased by 38.9%21 (from 54.9% to 93.8%).  30% of Hungarian exports went to 
Germany in 1995, 10.7% went to Austria and 8% to Italy.  They imported 23.5% from 
Germany, 12.3% from Russia and 9.7% from Austria.  In 1993 the private sector 
accounted for 59.4% of employment22.  Hungary received the bulk of FDI for CEEC’s in 
1996 (40%).  There were strong FDI inflows in 1999 but there were offset in 2000 by 
substantial portfolio equity outflows23.  By 2000 net external debt as a percentage of 
20     Op. Cit. Zoubir, Y and Lhabitant, F.S. 2003 
21     Op. Cit. Estrin, S. 2001 
22     Op. Cit. Anderson, RA. And Kegels, C. 1998 
23     IMF concludes Article IV Consultation with Hungary, International Monetary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP was half the 1995 level though it still remained high at 60%.  By 2000 FDI was 
$27.4 billion24.  Strong external demand boosted economic activity making Hungary one 
of the strongest performers in the CEEC region25.  In 2001 Hungarian per capita GDP 
was 53% of the EU average26.  Industrial output increased in 2002 with a 9.3% rise in 
food, drink and tobacco manufacturing and a 40% rise in machinery and equipment 
manufacturing27.  In 2003 real GDP was 2.9% as investment was sluggish and there was 
a negative contribution from net exports.28  The fiscal deficit reached 5.9% of GDP due 
to high current expenditures (social benefits and interest payments), weaker tax revenues 
(personal income and corporate taxes).  The current account deficit reached 5.7% of 
GDP.  Inflation reached 4.7%.  The unemployment rate was 5.8%.  See Appendix A 
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 and 1.5 for figures for Current Account Balance, External Debt and 
Foreign Debt.   
 
Table 1.8 
Industrial Production in Hungary 1990-200329 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
65 53.4 49.7 51.
6 
56.
4 
59.
9 
61.
5 
68.
1 
76.
5 
83.
9 
100
.2 
104
.2 
107 113 
 
 
 
Table 1.9  
Imports of Goods and Services in Hungary at 1995 prices (national currency, annual % 
change30) 
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
5.4 0.7 20 8.8 21.2 10.4 23.1 25.2 13.3 19.4 6.1 6.1 8 
 
 
Imports decreased by 20% in 2003 though this reduced to single figures by 2001 
Fund, Public Information Notice (OIN), No 01/47, May 18 2001 
24     Monthly Report, National Bank of Hungary, Statistical Department, 5/2002 
25     IMF concludes Article IV Consultation with Hungary, International Monetary 
Fund, Public Information Notice (PIN), No 01/47, May 18 2001 
26     Csajbok, A. and Scermely, A. “Adopting the Euro in Hungary: Expected Costs, 
Benefits and Training”, NBH Occasional Papers 24, 2001, Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
27     Monthly Report, National Bank of Hungary, Statistical Department, 5/2002 
28     Op. Cit. European Economy, 02/2004 
29     Op. Cit. International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
30     Ibid, IMF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
reflecting the reduced need for Hungary to buy from abroad.  As new companies 
emerged in Hungary there was increased scope of operations and increased domestic 
activity. 
 
Table 1.10 
Gross Nominal Wages in Total Economy in Hungary, Annual31 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 
10571 13446 22294 22294 29173 33309 38900 46837 57270 67764 77187 
 
 
Gross nominal wages increased almost threefold between 1990 and 1994.  By 2000 it 
had more than doubled again. 
 
Table 1.11 
Net Nominal Wages in Total Economy in Hungary32 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 
10108 12948 15628 18397 23049 25891 30544 38145 45162 50076 55785 
 
 
Table 1.12 
Real Wages per head in Hungary (annual % change)33 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
2.1 -1.3 -4.8 -2.2 2.4 `0.3 -4.8 6.1 7.0 10.1 5.8 
 
 
 
Above real wages fell in years 1994-1996, and 1999.  Increases are recorded in other 
years with a 10% increase in 2002. 
 
Table 1.13 
Growth of GDP/Components in Hungary34 
 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
31     Op. Cit. European Economy, 6.2003 
32     Op. Cit. European Economy, 6/2003 
33     Ibid. 6/2003 
34     Ibid. 6/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expor
ts of 
goods 
and 
servic
es 
2.7 -10.3 13.
6 
47.
5 
12.
6 
22.3 18.9 12.4 21 8.8 3.8 4.1 
Impor
ts of 
goods 
and 
servic
s 
0.7 20 8.8 21.
2 
10.
4 
23.1 25.2 13.3 19.
4 
6.1 6.1 8 
GDP -2.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.3 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2 3.8 3.3 2.9 
 
 
Exports fluctuated over the years with large increases recorded in 1995.  Imports also 
fluctuated with the level falling to 6% in 2001-2002. 
 
 
Table 1.14 
Persons in Employment in Hungary (annual average in 000)35 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
3623 3605 3611 3675 3792 3829 3845 3856 3969 
 
 
Employment increased year on year from the mid nineties onwards. 
 
 2.4  Monetary Policy in Hungary 
 
The National Bank of Hungary’s main instrument was the two week central bank deposit 
rate36.  This rate was the policy rate that reflected the monetary policy stance.  They also 
used the secured loan/deposit rate and the reserve rate.  They NBH bond was sold along 
with the sale and purchase of government papers, and the active and passive repo.  
Potential instruments included the interest rate ceiling and floor, the Lombard loan, and 
refinancing facilities and rediscounting.   
 
By 1991 Hungary had liberalised interest rates fully37.  The National Bank of Hungary 
used indirect monetary policy from 1990 onwards and in 1993 repurchase and reverse 
repurchase agreements based on government securities were introduced.  In January 
35     Eurostat Yearbook 2004, European Commission, The Statistical Guide to Europe, 
Data 1992-2002 
36     MNB, The Instruments of Monetary Policy, http://www.english.mnv.hu/module 
37     Op. Cit. Borish et al, 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
1991 Hungary’s programme of restructuring included a devaluation of 15%, further 
liberalisation of prices (90% of the consumer basket) and restrictive fiscal, monetary and 
incomes policies38.  Price liberalisation was extended at the end of 1990 and prices 
increased though subsequent inflation fell. In 1991 there was a tax placed on wage 
increases in excess of 28% in an effort to stabilise the economy. 
 
On May 4th 2001 the intervention band of the forint was widened to +-15%.  The 
exchange rate fluctuated from that time onwards within a narrow range.  The National 
Bank of Hungary cut interest rates five times since 2001.  Inflation in Hungary was 5.4% 
in 2002 and 5.2% in 200339.  The National Bank kept its key policy at 9.5% in 2002 and 
the exchange rate moved within its range of 240-245 forints per euro that year. 
 
Table 1.15 
Inflation in Hungary   
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 
33.4 32.3 21.6 21.1 21.2 28.3 23.6 18.3 14.3 10.1 9.5 
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicators, EBRD Transition Report 2000, William 
Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.16  
Interest Rate Spread in Hungary 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
4.1 4.7 8.6 9.7 7 7.6 7 4.23 4.14 3.87 3.56
8 
3.21 2.9
5 
1.7
7 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
 
The interest rate spread increased initially but by 1997 it had fallen to below 5%.  This 
reduced further to under 2% as the Hungarian economy operated to meet the standards set 
out by the EU for entry in 2004. 
 
 
38     Op. Cit. Anderson, R.A. and Kegels, C. 1988 
39     Quarterly Report on Inflation, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, November 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2.5 Economic Policy in Poland 
 
Poland implemented one of the more aggressive reform programmes after the collapse of 
the communist government in 198940.  It included macroeconomic stabilisation, 
microeconomic liberalisation and reform of the institutional structure of the economy.  
Poland experienced a post transformation slump between 1989-1991 (7.5% and 7% 
decreases in GDP in 1990 and 1991 respectively) though GDP growth reached 6.9% in 
1997 and then fell to 4.8% in 199841.  In 1991 when trade and capital was liberalised 
Poland saw an increase from 32.7% of GDP to 43.6%42.  Poland’s private sector 
accounted for 57.6% of total employment in 199343.  By 1994 private enterprise 
accounted for more than 50% of national output and nearly 60% of employment.  FDI 
increased rapidly and trade moved from CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance) to the West.  The inflation rate declined by a factor of 20 to 38%.  By 1994 
Poland was the first country in the region to see real GDP exceeding the GDP level of 
198944.  Also by the mid 1990’s there were concerns that the economy was overheating.  
Prior to 1995 growth was export led and there was moderate growth in domestic 
consumption and investment.  Investment then increased by over 20% between 1995 and 
1997 then fell to 15% in 1998 and 1.4% in 2000.  38.5% of Polish exports went to 
Germany in 1995 and 5.6% to Russia and 4.9% to Italy45.  26.6% of Polish imports were 
from Germany with 8.5% imported from Italy and 6.7% from Russia.  Poland received 
25% of FDI for CEEC’s in 1996 and this rose in 1997.  By 1999 policy had shifted to 
boost domestic demand with interest rate cuts and real wages growth.  By the end of the 
nineties Poland had reduced most of its trade links with Russia and was not duly affected 
by the 1998 rouble collapse.  They had increased trade with Germany and the rest of the 
EU. 
 
By 1998 Poland was one of the more robust East European economies which was 
accredited to the transparency in banking and finance and in the overall privatisation 
process.  By 1998 the trade share of GDP was 47%46.  At the end of 1998 Poland 
40     Ghemawat, Pankaj and Kennedy, Robert E. “Competitive Shocks and Industrial 
Structure: the Case of Polish Manufacturing”, William Davidson Institute, University of 
Michigan Business School, Working Paper No. 53, May 1997 
41     Blazca, George. “The Policy Business Scene in the Millenium”, European 
Business Review, Vol 12, Issue 5, 2000, pp265-273 
42     Op. Cit. Estrin, S. 2001 
43     Op. Cit. Anderson, R.A. and Kegels, C 1988 
44     Lill, Bruno.  “Economic Growth - GDP, Center for Markets in Transition”, HSE, 
October 2001, http://www.balticdata.info/poland/macro-economics/poland/ 
45     Op. Cit. Kurz, C and Wittle, V. 2002 
46     Angelucci, Manueal. Et al, “The Effect of Ownership and Competitive Pressure on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
experience a deep depressed trade and current account and this continued in 1999.  
However by the end of the 1990’s Poland was the economic leader of the three countries.  
It was argued that Poland’s approach which included bank restructuring and support for 
new firms, facilitated negotiated restructuring and risk sharing47  They created political 
conditions which were more conducive for institutional experimentation.  Their 
economic policies included gradual ownership change with institutional policies that 
allowed the government to monitor each other’s actions.  Also they witnessed a decline 
of 20% in non-performing loans.  Poland experienced a difficult year in 2001 and there 
was a large increase in the deficit48.  There were large increases in non-interest State 
spending with increases in transfers and subsidies to households, the agricultural sector 
and state enterprises and wages.  The cash deficit was around 5% of GDP, up 2.8% from 
2000.  After the slowdown of 2001-2002 Poland experienced a recovery in 200349.  
Growth in 2003 was 3.75%, up from 1.4% in 2002.  Growth was led by net exports and a 
depreciation of the zloty.  The unemployment rate was 19.8%.  By 2003 investment was 
stronger50.  Interest rates fell and a depreciation of currency created a competitive 
position for Poland.  See Appendix A Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 for figures for Current 
Account Balance and External Debt. 
 
 
Table 1.17 
Industrial Production in Poland 1994-200351 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 20
00 
2001 2002 2003 
90.426 69.724 76.275 84.87 88.811 93.018 100 100.443 101.845 110.756 
 
 
 
Table 1.18 
Imports of Goods and Services at 1995 Prices in Poland (national currency, annual % 
Firms Performance in Transition Countries: Micro Evidence from Bulgaria, Romania and 
Poland”, William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan Business School, Working 
Paper No. 434, January 2002 
47     McDermott, Gerald. “Institutional Change and Firm Creation in East-Central 
Europe: an Imbedded Politics Approach”, William Davidson Institute, University of 
Michigan Business School, Working Paper No 590, 2003 
48     Poland - 2002 Article IV Consultation Concluding Statement of the IMF Mission, 
IMF, March 14 2002, http://www.imf.org/external/np.ms/2002/031402.htm 
49     Op. Cit. European Economy, 02/2004 
50     Poland, Concluding Statement of the IMF Staff Mission, IMF, Warsaw, November 
20, 2003, http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2003/112003.htm 
51     Op. Cit. International Financial Statistics, IMF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
change)52 
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
29.7 1.8 13.1 11.3 24.2 28 21.4 18.5 1 15.6 16.1 -0.1 2.6 
 
 
 
The level of imported fluctuated over the time period with a negative figure of change 
recorded for 2002 reflecting difficult conditions world wide.  By 2003 imports had 
recovered to a positive figure. 
 
Table 1.19 
 
Gross Nominal Wages in the Total Economy in Poland53 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
289.7 390.4 525 690.9 874.3 1065.8 1232.7 1386.8 
 
Gross nominal wages increased with liberalisation along with net nominal wages (see 
table 1.20) 
Table 1.20 
Net Nominal Wages in the Total Economy in Poland54 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
103 175.6 243.9 320.2 425.5 560.6 720.5 877.3 1026.7 
 
 
Table 1.21 
 Real Wages Per Head in Poland (Annual % Change)55 
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
20.1 1.1 1.8 5.37 7 5.1 4 5.8 1.5 8.1 2.8 2.4 
 
 
1992 recorded a large increase in real wages but there was a marked reduction in this 
increase over the next few years.  Moderate increases were recorded for years 2002-2003 
which were more in line with changes in the rest of the EU. 
 
Table 1.22 
Growth of GDP/Components in Poland56 
52     Ibid. IMF 
53     Op. Cit. European Economy, 6/2003 
54     Op. Cit. European Economy, 6/2003 
55     Ibid. European Economy, 6/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
Exports 
of goods 
and 
services 
10.8 3.2 13.1 22.9 12 12.
2 
14.3 -2.6 23.2 10.
3 
4.8 6.5 
Imports 
of goods 
and 
services 
1.8 13.
1 
11.3 24.2 28 21.
4 
18.5 1. 15.6 -0.
1 
2.6 4.3 
GDP 2.5 3.7 5.3 7 6 6.8 4.8 4.1 4 1 1.4 3.3 
 
 
The level of exports and imports increased by the mid nineties and fell considerably by 
1999.  2000 saw a recovery in overseas trade with reduced figures for 2002-2003. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.23 
Persons in Employment in Poland (annual average in 000)57 
195 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
14791 14969 15177 15354 14757 14526 14207 13782 13627 
 
 
 
 
Employment fell between 1995 and 2003 reflecting the change in employment levels as 
the impact of the restructured state owned enterprises affected the whole economy. 
 
Table 1.24 
Foreign Investment in Poland 
 No of Registered Companies Value of Foreign Investment ($ 
millions) 
1990 2799 105 
1991 4797 324 
1992 10131 1408 
1993 15167 3041 
1994 19737 4321 
56     Ibid. European Economy, 6/2003 
57     Op. Cit. European Economy, 6/2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
1995 24086 6832 
1996 (June) 25000 10155 
 
 
Source: Polish Agency for Foreign Investment (PAIZ) 
 
The number of registered companies involved in FDI in Poland increased eight fold by 
the mid nineties with the value of foreign investment increasing ten fold. 
 
 
 2.6 Monetary Policy in Poland 
 
In Poland by 1990 interest rate ceilings were abandoned and banks set their own interest 
rates58.  Direct controls over credit were replaced by indirect monetary instruments 
though inflation remained high and volatile.  In 1991 Poland had strict monetary and 
fiscal policies.  Interest rates were raised and the zloty devalued.  Prices were liberalised 
along with the trade and foreign exchange system59.  Banks used the National Bank of 
Poland’s refinancing rate to determine their own interest rate though by 1992 market 
signals were used as a basis for interest rates.  Open market operations grew and 
developed.  In the 1990’s the rate of inflation declined overall though it increased from 
8.4% in 1999 to 11.6% in 200060.  Tight monetary policy leading to reduced domestic 
demand and investment and slow export growth, slowed economic growth to 4% in 2000.  
Economic growth was only 1.1% in 2001 and 1.3% in 2002. 
 
Table 1.25 
Inflation in Poland 
90 91 29 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 
555.4 76.7 45.3 37.6 29.5 19.9 14.9 11.8 7.3 9.9  
 
Source: World Bank Development Indicator, EBRD Transition Report 2000, William 
Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School 
 
The inflation rate fell from a high of over 500% in 1990 to under 20% by 1996.  It then 
fell further to single digits which was more in line with rate in the rest of the EU. 
 
58     Op. Cit. Borish et al, 1996 
59     Foley, Paul et al, “Economic Development in Poland: a Local Perspective”, 
European Business Review, MCB University Press, Volume 96, Number 2, p23-31 
60     Op. Cit. Zoubir, Y. and Lhabitant, F.S. 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.26 
 
Interest Rate Spread in Poland 
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
462.1 1.08 1.2
5 -1.124 .116 6.66 4.56 5.6 6.29 5.71 5.83 6.56 5.82 3.59 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
 
Poland’s interest rate spread fell dramatically once interest rate ceilings were abandoned.  
They are now similar to other EU countries. 
 
 
 2.7 The Impact of Economic and Monetary Policy on 
Economic Growth 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Table 1.27 
GDP Growth 1990-2003 
91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 
12 16 11 34 15 14 7 6 3 12 8 3 6 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
 
The Czech Republic experienced positive growth, year on year after financial 
deregulation took place.  Although prices increased and unemployment also increased, 
the liberalised environment allowed the private sector to become more involved in all 
economic activity.  Research suggests that the private sector is one of the most important 
instigators of economic activity and growth.  The Czech Republic did not suffer as much 
as other countries with high unemployment rates.  Trade had increased and the amount 
of FDI increased.  While liberalisation helped the Czech Republic to develop, the 
government also  continued to be involved in industry. Rapid privatisation helped the 
country to move forwards from central planning but it was hindered by the continuing 
state presence.  By the mid 1990’s the Czech Republic was the most advanced of the 
CEEC countries.  However by the end of the 1990’s this changed as the undeveloped 
banking system and lack of deep capital markets hindered further progress.  2000 was a 
positive year for economic growth but later years showed the difficulties the Czech 
Republic encountered as it became more dependent on the rest of the EU which was 
experiencing a downturn.  Overall financial liberalisation helped the Czech Republic to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
move ahead with a market based economy.  Inflation fell from large double digit figures 
to that similar to the rest of the EU.  The interest rate spread also fell over time down to 
4%.  The Czech economy made good progress in meeting conditions for EU entry whilst 
further progress needs to be made on reducing government involvement in industrial 
enterprises.  Overall the liberalisation of financial markets allowed industry to thrive 
without any great negative impact on unemployment levels.  This encouraged economic 
growth.   
 
 
 
 
Hungary 
 
Table 1.28 
GDP Growth 1990-2003 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
25 25 17 15 14 13 12 10 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
 
GDP growth increased year on year for Hungary once liberalisation was effected.  
Whilst prices increased initially inflation came under control as the government 
intervened directly to ensure economic stability.  Hungary benefited from large FDI 
inflows more than other CEEC’s.  Inflation levels quickly fell to acceptable levels, down 
to 5%.  The spread of interest rates increased in the mid nineties though it later fell to 
under 25%.  Hungary met the conditions necessary for EU entry and the overall impact 
of the financial liberalisation programme was positive. 
 
Poland 
 
Table 1.29 
GDP Growth 1990-2003 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
30 23 15 14 9 3 2 5 
 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund 
 
GDP in Poland increased once financial markets were liberalised.  Whilst the levels of 
GDP increases fell over time there was still positive growth throughout the time period 
studied.  Poland had one of the most aggressive reform programmes and they quickly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
began to increase trade wit the West once CMEA collapsed.  By the mid nineties the 
country was experiencing growth levels similar to pre-reform days and there was concern 
that the economy was overheating.  Inflation was a prime problem for Poland initially 
though rates have fallen to single digit figures.  Interest rate spreads reduced to levels 
seen in other countries of the EU whilst unemployment remained high.  Poland’s 
massive transformation was one that showed real results.   Banks were restructured 
along with state owned industry.  Considering the size of this country and the scale of 
the restructuring process Poland managed to turn around its economy relatively quickly.  
Financial liberalisation was needed by Poland to reduce inflation rates and interest rate 
spreads in order to encourage increased industrial activity.     
3.0 Credit Policy 
 
Previously there has been debate over causes of economic growth in different economies 
but we now have acceptance that financial liberalisation is one of the prime determinants.  
More specifically the availability of credit has been the focus of recent studies61.  Kelly 
and Everett found that where credit expanded rapidly, high growth followed.  Financial 
liberalisation for the three countries in this study mean abolition of: exchange controls, 
interest rate fixing and credit rationing.  The state sector had been the prime receiver of 
credit up to the early nineties but from then onwards there was a rapid decline in lending 
by financial institutions to the government.  The private sector became the net benefiter 
of credit and the experience of each country is now examined. 
 
Czech Republic 
 
Table 1.30 
Total Credit in the Czech Republic, annual average62 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
647.2 759.5 873.5 973.2 1074.8 1122.7 1080.7 1022.5 
 
 
 
Table 1.31 
Total Credit in the Czech Republic: Share in GDP63 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
63.4 64.2 63.2 62.1 64.0 61.4 59.0 53.5 
61     Kelly, John and Everett, Mary.  “Financial Liberalisation and Economic Growth 
in Ireland,” Quarterly Bulletin, Central Bank, Autumn 2004, pp91-112 
62    World Bank Indicators, EIU and EBRD Transition Indicators 
63    Ibid. World Bank Indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.32 
Credit to Government in the Czech Republic64 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
100.2 116.8 428.6 804.1 914.1 1537.9 5451.6 
 
 
 
Table 1.33 
Credit to Other Sectors in the Czech Republic (in €million)65 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
23544.6 25979.0 29321.4 30547.9 28637.5 29023.9 24260.7 
 
 
 
Table 1.34 
Domestic Credit in the Czech Republic, in % of GDP66 
1989 1990 1991 
72.7 74.7 72.1 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.35 
Credit to Enterprise and Household Sectors in the Czech Republic 
1989 1990 1991 
76.5 71.0 66.0 
 
64    Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South-East European Countries, data 
1996-2000, 1995-1999, European Commission, Eurostat Theme 1, General Statistics, 
Yearbook 2002/01/03 
65    Ibid. Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South-East European Countries 
66    Ibid. Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South-East European Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.36 
 
Credit to Non Financial Public Enterprises in the Czech Republic 
1989 1990 1991 
70.3 65.1 62.0 
 
The tables above show that total credit in the Czech Republic increased up to 1997 and 
fell from 1998 onwards.  The government continued to receive increasing amounts of 
credit year on year.  GDP showed positive growth each year (see table 1.27 earlier) 
though it fell to single figures for years 1997-1999 and 2001 onwards.  This pattern was 
similar to private sector credit figures which increased from 1995-1998 and then fell over 
the following years. 
 
Table 1.37 
Bank Lending to Households in Euro Member Countries in 2000 (as a % of GDP)67 
 
 Households Of which:  
  Real Property Loans Consumer Credit 
Euro Area - average 45.9 29.1 7.3 
Czech Republic 6.3   
 
 
Source: ECB 
 
When lending to households in the Czech Republic is compared to the average in euro 
member countries, the figure is well below average.  Household credit is a large 
determinant of economic growth and Kelly and Everett’s study cited previously, shows 
how private sector credit was a major factor in explaining the large economic growth 
experienced in Ireland in the 1990’s. 
 
Borish discovered that lending to enterprises in the Czech Republic in 1995 was around 
60-70% of total credit68.  Lending to the private sector was 34% of GDP in 1992 and 
52% in 1995 showing a positive move.  Lending to the government declined from 7% in 
1992 to 2% in 1995, reflecting the reduced role of the government in industrial activity.  
67    Czsjbok, A. and Csermely, A. “Adopting the Euro in Hungary: Expected Costs, 
Benefits and Timing”, NBH Occasional Papers 24, 2001, Magyar Nemzeti Bank 
68    Op. Cit. Borish, 1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Between 1992 and 1995 domestic credit increased two thirds, running parallel to GDP 
growth.  Most of the increased lending was to the private sector though there was some 
increase in lending to public functions like health and education.  The biggest reduction 
in credit has been to the state owned enterprises.  Whilst lending rates stabilised there 
was upward pressure due to the high levels of non performing loans. 
 
Table 1.38 
Total Credit to the Economy in the Czech Republic (in €millions)69 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
236543.7 26095.8 29750 31352 29551.6 30561.8 16503.2 
 
 
Credit level increased from 1995-1998 with a fall in 1999.  Whilst there was increased 
credit allocation in 2000 this fell in 2001 reflecting the reduced inward investment into 
the country. 
 
Table 1.39 
Allocation of Credit by Sector in the Czech Republic ($ million) 
Government, net 1834 1041 
Enterprises 16750 24249 
SOE’s 9816 5179 
Private 6935 19067 
Household 2525 3828 
Other 91 5921 
Domestic Credit 21201 35039 
 
 
The financial institutions changed their lending habits and began moving away from the 
government and state owned sectors to increase credit levels to enterprises, households 
and the private sector. 
 
Hungary 
 
Table 1.40 
Total Credit in Hungary, annual average70 
69    Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South-East European Countries, data 
1996-2000, 1995-1999. 1997-2001, European Commission, Eurostat Theme 1, General 
Statistics, Yearbook 2002/01/03 
70   Op. Cit. World Bank Development Indicators, EIU and EBRD Transition Indicators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
942.9 1068.8 1220.3 2495.3 1775.5 2253.8 2614.8 3418.3 
 
 
Table 1.41 
Total Credit: Share in GDP in Hungary71 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
26.6 24.5 21.7 36.2 20.8 22.3 22.9 26.2 
 
 
Total credit fluctuated slightly over the time period but was positive whilst the credit 
share of GDP fluctuated also. 
 
 
Table 1.42  
Credit to Government in Hungary (in €millions)72 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
9992.5 19615.6 17040 16255.7 13362.4 12862.6 12961.5 
 
 
 
Table 1.43 
Credit to Other Sectors in Hungary (in €millions)73 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
6915 7351.1 9243.1 9673.4 11651 15095.1 19293.5 
 
 
 
Credit to government fell whilst credit to other sectors increased.  Hungary recorded 
positive economic growth from 1994 onwards (see Table 1.13 earlier) showing a positive 
relationship between credit to non-government and GDP. 
 
Table 1.44 
Domestic Credit % of GDP in Hungary74 
1990 1991 1992 
71  Op. Cit. World Bank Indicators, EIU and IBRD Transition Indicators 
72   Op. Cit. Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South-East European Countries 
73   Ibid. Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South-East European Countries 
74   Op. Cit. Calvo et al, 1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
83.4 78.6 77.6 
 
 
Table 1.45 
Credit to Enterprise and Household Sectors in Hungary75 
 
1989 1990 1991 
49.3 42.7 42 
 
 
 
Table 1.46 
Hungary: Banking Survey 1994-199676 
  1994    1995   1996 
 Mar Jun Sept Dec Mar Jun Sept Dec Mar 
Domestic 
Credit 
2468 2659.
4 
2666.
2 
2792 2974.1 2973.9 3057.6 2770.7 2816.
6 
General  
Government, 
net 
1413.
1 
1552.
2 
1519.
8 
1579.
3 
1697.3 1705.4 1763.9 1442.9 1522.
1 
Central 
Government, 
net 
1138 1189.
9 
1163.
6 
1217.
8 
1326.8 1342.8 1324.7 1247.8 1020.
6 
Enterprises 700.4 747.3 775 780.5 868 875.6 915.6 928.6 920.4 
Households 231.7 226.4 230.1 273.8 261.5 248.4 237 253.8 231.1 
Small 
Enterprises 
86.6 91.2 91.1 89.2 82.6 78.6 71.1 70.8 67.9 
Other 
Financial 
Institutions 
0.4 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.5 1.9 1.5 1.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75   Ibid. Calvo et al, 1993 
76   MNB, Data provided by Hungarian Authorities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.47 
Bank Lending to Households in Euro Member Countries in 2000 (as a % of GDP) 
 Households Real Property Loans Consumer Credit 
Euro Area - average 45.9 29.1 7.3 
Hungary 4.7 1.5 3.2* 
 
 
*Consumer credit and other loans  Source: ECB, NBH 
 
Above, Hungary’s level of funding to household is well below that of the EU average.  
Borish’s studies found that lending to enterprises to Hungary in 1995 was around 50% of 
total credit77.  Domestic credit decreased by 21% between 1990 and 1995 which meant 
that Hungary was the only CEEC to experience a decline in credit during this time78.  
Domestic credit (as % of GDP) fell from 83% (one of the highest in Europe) to 54%.  
Lending to the government remained steady with a fall rate for both the enterprise and 
household sectors. 
 
Table 1.48 
Total Credit to Economy in Hungary ( in € millions)79 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
16907.5 25966.7 26283.1 25929.1 25013.4 27957.7 32255 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.49 
77   Op. Cit. Borish, 1996 
78   Ibid. Borish, 1996 
79   Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South-East Euroean Countries, data 
1996-2000, 1995-1999, 1997-2001, European Commission, Eurostat Theme 1, General 
Statistics, Yearbook 2002/01/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
Allocation of Credit by Sector in Hungary ($ millions) 
 1990 1995 
Government, net 12243 12381 
Enterprises 9671 6861 
SOE’s na na 
Private na na 
Household 6086 2351 
Other 20 111 
Domestic Credit 28020 22141 
 
The above table shows a reduction of credit to enterprises and households and lower 
levels of domestic credit reflecting an overall reduction in credit between 1992 and 12005 
in Hungary.  The government received a small increase in credit. 
 
Table 1.50 
Net Financial Saving of Households 1991-1996 in Hungary (billion of forint: end of 
period) 
 91 93 93
q4 
94
q1 
94
q2 
94q
3 
94
q4 
95
q1 
95
q2 
95
q3 
95q
4 
96q
1 
Saving 888 1171 1378 1459 1532 1626 1717 1783 1879 1990 2109 2221 
Cash 205 270 322 348 356 363 363 345 363 377 386 362 
Deposits 432 582 696 716 756 815 866 917 966 1021 1079 1125 
Foreign 
Deposits 
303 430 491 497 520 543 573 568 584 610 640 669 
Foreign 
Currency 
Depotis 
130 153 205 219 273 273 294 3483 382 411 439 455 
Securities 214 280 308 44 364 392 430 459 484 525 575 659 
Credits: 241 252 283 286 290 305 317 313 309 307 30 292 
Of which 
From 
Financial  
Institutio
ns 
 
202 209 240 243 248 262 274 270 266 264 254 249 
Net  
Savings 
position 
647 647 1096 1173 1173 1322 1400 1470 1570 1683 1812 1929 
 
Source: National Bank of Hungary 
The above table shows that savings increased each year over the period studied thus 
allowing increased investment opportunities for industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poland 
 
Table 1.51 
Total Credit in Poland, Annual Average80 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
30658.4 37406.7 48904.4 66132.7 95889 125752.8 159088.6 186188.7 
 
 
Table 1.52 
Total Credit in Poland: Share in GDP81 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
19.7 16.6 15.9 17.1 20.3 22.7 25.8 27 
 
 
 
Table 1.53 
Total Credit to Economy in Poland (in € millions)82 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
46230.5 52873.5 62937.4 73519.4 89984.3 
 
 
Table 1.54 
Credit to Government in Poland (in € millions)83 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
18341.8 19037.2 20633.2 19919.2 26482 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.55 
Credit to Other Sectors in Poland (in € millions)84 
1998 1999 2000 2001 
80   Op. Cit. World Bank Development Indicators, EIU and EBRD Transition Indicators 
81   Ibid. World Bank Development Indicators, EIU and EBRD Transition Indicators 
82   Op. Cit. Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South-East European Countries 
83   Ibid. Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South-East European Countries 
84   Ibid. Statistical Yearbook on Candidate and South-East European Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
33836.3 42303.2 53600.2 63502.3 
 
 
Table 1.56 
Domestic Credit in Poland, in % of GDP85 
1989 1990 1991 
26.1 12.5 23.8 
 
 
Table 1.57 
Credit to Enterprise and Household Sector in Poland86 
1989 1990 1991 
22.6 12.7 18.8 
 
 
In Poland total credit sector grew steadily from 1993-20003 whilst GDP showed positive 
growth each year (see Table 1.22 earlier) indicating a positive relationship between the 
two variables.  Credit to the government fluctuated during the time period studied and 
the positive growth in GDP can be attributed to the private sector selecting projects that 
had high returns. 
 
Borish’s87 studies found that lending to enterprises in Poland was 3% of GDP in 1990 
and 13% in 1995.  Domestic credit increased by 250% between 1990 and 1995.  By 
1995 it stood at 34% of GDP which was low.  Lending to government increased 
significantly and the government moved from being a ned lender in 1990 to accounting 
for 43% of domestic credit.  By 1995 credit to the private sector and households 
increased.  The SOE’s had a fall in credit from 93% in 1990 to 21% of total credit in 
1995.  The private sector (households and enterprises) received 37% of total credit in 
1995 compared to 15% in 1990.  Lending rates remained high as provision for loan 
losses were already made. 
 
Table 1.58 
Allocation of Credit by Sector in Poland88 
 1990 1995 
85   Op. Cit. Calvo et al, 1993 
86   Ibid. Calvo et al, 1993 
87   Op. Cit.Borish, Michael. S. et al, 1996 
88   Op. Cit. Csajbok, A. and Csermely, A. 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
($ Millions)   
Government, net -964 16973 
Enterprises 11827 20507 
SOE’s 10637 8244 
Private 1191 12263 
Household 619 2277 
Other 0 0 
Domestic Credit 11483 39758 
 
 
Above the government moved from being a net lender to benefiter of credit between 1992 
and 1995.  Enterprises, the private sector and households also received higher levels of 
credit over time with a reduction in the amount lent to the private sector. 
 
Table 1.59 
Bank Lending to Households in Euro Member Countries in 2000 in Poland (as a % of 
GDP)89 
 Household Of which: Consumer Credit 
Euro area - average 45.9 29.1 7.3 
Poland 7.0   
 
 
Poland’s lending to households compared to the EU average was low. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3.1 The Impact of Credit Growth on Economic Growth and 
Development 
 
Czech Republic 
 
The Czech Republic initially saw an increase in credit to the private sector which fell 
89   Op. Cit. Csajbok, A and Csermely, A. 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
over time.  This was in contrast to credit to the government which took the opposite 
direction i.e. as credit to the private sector fell, credit to government increased.  Studies 
have shows that increased levels of credit to the private sector is one of the main 
determinants of economic growth.  For countries to pursue this path of growth there 
must be sufficient investment in the country for funds to be available for investment.  
The Czech Republic received FDI from the West and households saved funds in the 
banking system (once they got used to liberalisation and the increased amounts and 
variety of goods and services).  However the amount of funds available within the 
banking system was insufficient for higher levels of credit to be given to the private 
sector.  This will change as increased liberalisation of markets results in EU entry and 
will lead to increased trade with the West and the former CEEC’s.  FDI will increase 
further and it more indigenous businesses will set up thus increasing investment 
opportunities and attracting capital from within and outside the country. 
 
Hungary 
 
Hungary increased levels of credit to the private sector whilst it reduced levels to the 
government.  This encouraged economic growth.  Hungary received the largest share of 
FDI to the former CEEC’s and they were able to take advantage of this increased 
investment and increased levels of credit to the private sector.  Studies reveal that the 
private sector is best placed to deal with credit as they are in a position to select high 
return projects.  These projects then generate further income which can be reinvested in 
the banking system, thus increasing levels of credit further.  Previous habits of lending 
large amounts to the state sector meant that initially the private sector was crowded out to 
a large degree.  A lot of investment funds were used to prop up inefficient industry. 
 
Poland 
 
Poland experienced growth in GDP and also strong increases in levels of credit to the 
private sector.  Of the three countries studied Poland had the longest tradition with 
private enterprise and long before the market was restructured there were many small 
enterprises operating in Poland.  This escalated in 1989 with large and small enterprises 
being set up by private individuals.  Credit to the government fell over time as state 
involvement was reduced with the large privatisation programme.  The increase in 
private sector credit contributed to economic growth and with EU entry levels of 
investment into Poland will increase.  This will lead to increased access to credit for all 
industry thus boosting economic growth further. 
 
4.0 Summary and Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Price liberalisation for all three countries led to increased inflation though stabilisation 
measures were introduced to induce stability.  All three countries experienced major 
economic shocks with the break up of CMEA trade, removal of direct subsidies to 
enterprises, trade and price liberalisation and increases in energy prices.  Each country 
managed to turn around its economy by 1995 though employment levels were lower than 
that experienced in 1990.  Whilst private enterprises contributed enormously to an 
increase in employment levels it was not enough to make up for the fall in employment 
from the structuring of state owned enterprises. 
 
All three countries have low household credit levels that fall well below the credit levels 
of the average country in the EU.  Increased household credit should lead to increased 
demand for goods and services which will boost economic demand.  Increased access to 
loans by small and medium businesses will increase domestic production and again raise 
economic output and growth.  Whilst all three countries received increasing amounts of 
FDI there were still barriers to entry for firms in the West given the geographical and 
economic stances of these countries.  Since May 2004 this has changed as the three have 
joined the EU though they still hold their own currency and have individual monetary 
policies.  All three countries have agreed to join the euro and adopt a common monetary 
policy.  This will open up markets further and allow easier entry of FDI.  Strong levels 
of credit with affordable rates of interest will allow households and enterprises easy 
access to loans and levels of credit available in Western Europe.  High economic growth 
is likely to follow though all three countries will have to monitor inflation levels to 
ensure they do not rise above acceptable levels and negate any advancements made. 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A 
 
Table 1.60  
Current Account Balance in the Czech Republic (as % of GDP)90 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
-3.9 -4.2 -1.0 0.3 -0.1 -2.6 -7.4 -6.1 -2.4 -2.0 -2.0 
 
 
 
Table 1.61   
90  World Bank Development Indicators, EBRD Transition Report 2000 and WDI Staff 
Calculations, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Business School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
External Debt in the Czech Republic (as % of GDP)91 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
20.3 33.1 23.7 24.7 26 31.8 36 40.6 43.1 42.3 
 
 
External debt doubled between 1990 and 1999 reflecting the Czech Republic’s increasing 
external debt. 
 
Table 1.62  
Current Account Balance in Hungary (as % of GDP)92 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
1.1 0.8 0.9 -9.0 -9.4 -5.6 -3.7 -2.1 -4.9 -4.2 -5.4 
 
 
 
Table 1.63  
External Debt in Hungary (as % of GDP)93 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
64.4 67.7 58.1 63.7 68.7 70.4 61.1 51.9 56.9 59.9 
 
Table 1.64  
Hungary: Foreign Debt, 1990-199594 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Total Debt 21205 22812 21655 24556 28526 31660 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.65  
Current Account Balance in Poland (as % of GDP)95 
 
91  Op. Cit. World Bank Development Indicators, EIU and EBRD Indicators 
92  Op. Cit. World Bank Development Indicators, EBRD Transition Report 2000 and 
WDI Staff Calculations,  
93  Op. Cit. World Bank Development Indicators, EIU and EBRD Indicators 
94  National Bank of Hungary 
95  Op. Cit. World Bank Development Indicators, EBRD Transition Report 2000 and 
WDI Staff Calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
 
 
 
 
 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
5.2 -2.6 1.1 -0.7 2.5 4.6 -1.0 -3.2 -4.4 -7.6 -6.0 
 
 
 
Table 1.66  
External Debt in Poland (as % of GDP)96 
 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
83.7 69.9 56.4 54.9 47.1 38 35.2 36 36.2 38.3 
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